We examine whether and why previous Security Council decisions establish institutional opportunity structures that exert influence on both the behavior of member states in organizational decision processes and their collective decisions. Theoretically, we demonstrate that doctrines and other previous decisions provide focal points around which actors expectations can converge in coordination situations to identify a single coordination solution. They also provide incentives for stepwise upgrading enforcement measures in crisis situations that trigger an institutional logic of escalation. Council decision-making in the Libya crisis of 2011 clearly exemplifies these institutional effects. Even in spite of continuing gridlock within the Council on the current crisis in Syria, member states adjust their individual decision-making behavior to opportunity structures arising from their previous decisions.
|Translated title of the contribution||Institutional opportunity structures in the United Nations Security Council. The role of doctrines and previous decisions on decision-making behavior of member states and their collective decisions on intervention into intrastate conflict|
|Number of pages||27|
|State||Published - 2015|
- Humanitarian intervention
- Security council
- Theory of international organizations