Intra-household bargaining power and household expenditure allocation: Evidence from Iran

Bharati Basu, Pushkar Maitra

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations


This article examines the role of intra-household bargaining power on household expenditure patterns in Iran to see whether women’s empowerment can achieve similar results in Iran as we have seen it achieve in other countries of the world. This study is insightful because it tells us whether Iranian women, who have experienced both economic and noneconomic constraints over many years, can utilize increased power toward economic development. The bargaining power is measured by the sex ratio in the marriage market. Using the Household Income and Expenditure Survey in Iran, we find that greater bargaining power of women contributes significantly toward greater provision of education and health expenditure within the household, creating a potential for an increase in welfare for the next generation.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)606-627
Number of pages22
JournalReview of Development Economics
Issue number2
StatePublished - May 1 2020


  • Iran
  • expenditure allocation
  • intra-household bargaining power


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