TY - GEN
T1 - PDF Mirage
T2 - 26th USENIX Security Symposium
AU - Markwood, Ian
AU - Shen, Dakun
AU - Liu, Yao
AU - Lu, Zhuo
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 by The USENIX Association. All Rights Reserved.
PY - 2017
Y1 - 2017
N2 - We present a new class of content masking attacks against the Adobe PDF standard, causing documents to appear to humans dissimilar to the underlying content extracted by information-based services. We show three attack variants with notable impact on real-world systems. Our first attack allows academic paper writers and reviewers to collude via subverting the automatic reviewer assignment systems in current use by academic conferences including INFOCOM, which we reproduced. Our second attack renders ineffective plagiarism detection software, particularly Turnitin, targeting specific small plagiarism similarity scores to appear natural and evade detection. In our final attack, we place masked content into the indexes for Bing, Yahoo!, and DuckDuckGo which renders as information entirely different from the keywords used to locate it, enabling spam, profane, or possibly illegal content to go unnoticed by these search engines but still returned in unrelated search results. Lastly, as these systems eschew optical character recognition (OCR) for its overhead, we offer a comprehensive and lightweight alternative mitigation method.
AB - We present a new class of content masking attacks against the Adobe PDF standard, causing documents to appear to humans dissimilar to the underlying content extracted by information-based services. We show three attack variants with notable impact on real-world systems. Our first attack allows academic paper writers and reviewers to collude via subverting the automatic reviewer assignment systems in current use by academic conferences including INFOCOM, which we reproduced. Our second attack renders ineffective plagiarism detection software, particularly Turnitin, targeting specific small plagiarism similarity scores to appear natural and evade detection. In our final attack, we place masked content into the indexes for Bing, Yahoo!, and DuckDuckGo which renders as information entirely different from the keywords used to locate it, enabling spam, profane, or possibly illegal content to go unnoticed by these search engines but still returned in unrelated search results. Lastly, as these systems eschew optical character recognition (OCR) for its overhead, we offer a comprehensive and lightweight alternative mitigation method.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85053873309&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85053873309
T3 - Proceedings of the 26th USENIX Security Symposium
SP - 833
EP - 847
BT - Proceedings of the 26th USENIX Security Symposium
PB - USENIX Association
Y2 - 16 August 2017 through 18 August 2017
ER -