This article explores the influence of institutional arrangements in European regulatory regimes on the problem solving capacity of supranational risk regulation. Mainly two factors are able to enhance problem-adequate regulation: Functional differentiation of decision-making ensures that political actors focus on the definition of general regulatory objectives while implementation decisions are delegated to specialised bodies with high technical and scientific expertise. In addition, legalisation commits actors during the implementation process to observe the regulatory criteria defined before. The "new approach", which applies for EU product regulation since the 1980s, provides institutional arrangements which follow this logic. In reality, the new approach was not applied equally strictly with regard to all kinds of products. We show that this institutional variance can explain the diverging success of European regulation in the areas of pharmaceuticals, food and technical products.
|Translated title of the contribution||Risk regulation in the European single market: Regulatory agencies, standardisation organisations, and comitology committees|
|Issue number||SUPPL. 40|
|State||Published - 2007|