The hypothetical intentionalist's dilemma: A reply to Levinson

Robert Stecker, Stephen Davies

    Research output: Contribution to journalComment/debate

    4 Scopus citations


    In a recent essay, Jerrold Levinson defends his version of hypothetical intentionalism (HI), which is a theory of literary interpretation, from two criticisms. The first, argued by Stephen Davies, is that it is equivalent to the value-maximizing view. The second, argued by Robert Stecker, is that there are straightforward counterexamples to HI. We will argue that Levinson does not successfully fend off either criticism, and further, that in the process of attempting to do so, creates another dilemma for his view.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)307-312
    Number of pages6
    JournalThe British Journal of Aesthetics
    Issue number3
    StatePublished - Jul 2010


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