Abstract
Why are some newly appointed CEOs dismissed from their positions while others are not? Is it hard<br>for newly appointed CEOs to survive in highly diversified firms? Drawing upon the concepts of<br>executive job demands and information-processing theory, we argue that newly appointed CEOs face<br>entirely different degrees of complexity and challenges in their role, and that firms’ product diversification and international diversification predict dismissals of newly appointed CEOs after<br>controlling for other possible explanatory variables. Additionally, we propose that appointment of a<br>new outsider CEO makes newly appointed CEOs more vulnerable to dismissal and consequently<br>strengthens the predicted relationships. The empirical results support our arguments. These results<br>suggest that the demands faced by a high degree of (product or international) diversification are likely<br>to present challenges that increase the likelihood of corporate disruption through the departures of<br>newly appointed CEOs. Contributions to the CEO dismissal and succession literature are discussed.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Journal | Journal of Management & Organization |
State | Published - Mar 3 2015 |